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Note
CRACKING THE CODE OF UNITED STATES V.
VIRGINIA
DAVID K. BOWSHER†
Mutability [of language] is so inescapable that it even holds true for
artificial languages: Whoever creates a language controls it only so
long as it is not in circulation; from the moment when it fulfils [sic]
its mission and becomes the property of everyone, control is lost.1
INTRODUCTION
In setting forth tests and standards for constitutionality, the
Supreme Court frequently creates its own artificial language that
derives its meaning primarily through repeated application. Indeed,
in United States v. Virginia,2 Chief Justice William Rehnquist
acknowledged the mutable nature of the Court’s language when he
remarked that even the most familiar tests and standards adopted by
the Court “are hardly models of precision.”3 Given language’s
mutability, the words of these tests and standards should be used
consistently in order to prevent them from being misinterpreted, as
has happened to the language in United States v. Virginia.
In United States v. Virginia, the Court struck down the
admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a state
school that admitted only men, because it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In considering the
constitutionality of VMI’s admissions policy, the Court applied
      † I am grateful to H. Jefferson Powell for his comments on early drafts of this Note. I
would like to dedicate this Note to my grandfather, Willis J. Meriwether, Jr., VMI ’33.
1. Ferdinand de Saussure, Nature of the Linguistic Sign (Wade Baskin trans., 1916), in
DAN LATIMER, CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY 3, 12 (1989).
2. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
3. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
4. See id. at 519.
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intermediate scrutiny to the gender5 classification,6 just as it had in
similar cases for more than twenty years.7 “Intermediate scrutiny” is
so named because it lies between the two other levels of equal
protection scrutiny: rational basis scrutiny, which presumes laws to be
valid and requires only that they be rationally related to some
legitimate governmental interests,8 and strict scrutiny, which requires
that laws be “narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.”9 In general, racial and religious
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny,10 gender classifications are
subject to intermediate scrutiny,11 and all other classifications are
subject to rational basis scrutiny.12
The language used by the Court in United States v. Virginia
differed from the language normally used in gender-based equal
protection cases. Instead of examining VMI’s admissions policy in
terms of its “substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives,”13 the Court placed new emphasis on the presence or
absence of an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the policy
and introduced the phrase “skeptical scrutiny” to refer to its inquiry.14
Of the six federal Courts of Appeals that have considered
whether United States v. Virginia heightened the standard of scrutiny,
5. I use the word “gender” instead of the word “sex” for a reason identified by Justice
Ginsburg: the word “sex” conjures up images of bordellos while the word “gender” has a more
harmless connotation. See Catharine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains Origin of Sex, Gender, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A28.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social
and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The
general rule [in the context of the Equal Protection Clause] is that legislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (“In these cases, involving
distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there is any
rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state
legislatures.”).
9. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
10. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
11. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). Discriminatory
classifications based on illegitimacy are also subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982).
12. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
      13. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
14. See infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
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five have concluded that it did not.15 Many scholars and some judges,
however, including the three who sat on a Sixth Circuit panel, have
reached the opposite conclusion. They have interpreted the use of
such phrases to mean that gender classifications are now subject to a
level of scrutiny more strict than intermediate scrutiny,16 although
they disagree about exactly how strict the examination would be.17
Several of these scholars have also focused on the very active role
that Justice Ginsburg, the author of the majority opinion, played in
the women’s rights struggle of the 1970s.18
15. See infra note 172.
      16. See infra Part II.C.1.
17. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that United
States v. Virginia “appear[ed] to create a new standard of review for gender-based
classifications, requiring an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ on the part of the
governmental actor”); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia’s New Gender
Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 845, 869-70 (1997) (speculating that the Court’s use of the phrase “at least” in
formulating its intermediate scrutiny standard is evidence of a heightened level of review);
Carrie Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection and East
Harlem’s Young Women’s Leadership School, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 1010 (1997) (arguing
that the Court’s use of “exceedingly persuasive justification” suggested “that the Court might
have applied a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny or, perhaps, even strict scrutiny”);
Karen L. Kupetz, Note, Equal Benefits, Equal Burdens: “Skeptical Scrutiny” for Gender
Classifications After United States v. Virginia, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1997)
(interpreting the Court’s single use of the phrase “skeptical scrutiny” to herald the application
of a new level of constitutional scrutiny); Collin O. Udell, Note, Signaling a New Direction in
Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521, 553 (1996)
(interpreting the Court’s use of the phrase “exceedingly persuasive justification” in United
States v. Virginia as signaling the application of “the more rigorous formulation of the
intermediate scrutiny test . . . , the ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ formulation”); see also
Engineering Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546,
1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (admitting confusion over the state of gender-based equal protection law
after United States v. Virginia); Barbara A. Lee, Discrimination Against Students in Higher
Education: A Review of the 1996 Judicial Decisions, 24 J.C. & U.L. 619, 622 (1998) (“Also left
unanswered is whether Justice Ginsburg’s ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ standard is
closer to strict scrutiny than to intermediate scrutiny, and whether it will be used by federal
courts in future challenges to sex-based classifications.”). But see, e.g., Larry Cata Backer,
Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art of Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361,
369 (1997) (arguing that the United States v. Virginia Court did not heighten the level of
scrutiny applied to gender classifications); Tod C. Gurney, Comment, The Aftermath of the
Virginia Military Institute Decision: Will Single-Gender Education Survive?, 38 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1998) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny was applied in United States v.
Virginia).
18. See, e.g., Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1338 (explaining Ginsburg’s influence on the initial
application of intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination cases in 1976); Udell, supra note
17, at 525 (describing Ginsburg’s dedication to “guid[ing] the evolution of equal protection
gender jurisprudence” through her work with the ACLU in the 1970s).
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The judges and scholars who think that the United States v.
Virginia Court heightened the standard of scrutiny applied to gender
classifications are mistaken. Although the language used in the
majority opinion in United States v. Virginia is different from that
used in earlier gender-based equal protection opinions, the
differences are relatively minor and do not represent a change from
the Court’s gender-based equal protection jurisprudence of the
previous twenty years.19
This Note demonstrates that, while the United States v. Virginia
Court did not heighten the standard of scrutiny applied to gender
classifications, the Court did use language that is needlessly
confusing.20 In order to examine both the language and the meaning
of the Court’s gender-based equal protection jurisprudence, this Note
employs a model of communication developed by the linguist Roman
Jakobson. Jakobson used this model to explain how the differing
elements of communication—language (CODE), surrounding
circumstances (CONTEXT), and meaning (MESSAGE)—are
understood:
The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To be
operative the message requires a CONTEXT referred to (“referent” in
another, somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature), seizable by the
addressee, and either verbal or capable of being verbalized; a CODE
fully, or at least partially, common to the addresser and addressee
(or in other words, to the encoder and decoder of the message); and
finally, a CONTACT, a physical channel and psychological connection
between the addresser and the addressee, enabling both of them to
enter and stay in communication.21
Thus, if language is mutable, then a CODE may change while the
MESSAGE stays the same.22 Of course, changing a CODE for no
reason23 while retaining the same MESSAGE will do little but confuse
the ADDRESSEE.
19. See infra Part I.
20. Other commentators have noted the confusing nature of the United States v. Virginia
Court’s language. See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 17, at 1207.
21. Roman Jakobson, Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics, in STYLE IN LANGUAGE
350, 353 (Thomas A. Sebeok ed., 1960).
22. For example, the airport serving Washington, D.C., long known as Washington
National Airport, is now officially called Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. See
Pub. L. No. 105-154, § 1575, 112 Stat. 3 (1998). It is the same airport, but Congress dictated a
new CODE to represent that MESSAGE.
23. There are obviously good reasons to change some CODES, such as to avoid using
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Part I of this Note explores the state of gender-based equal
protection law before United States v. Virginia and shows that, for the
most part, both the MESSAGE and the CODE of intermediate scrutiny
for gender-based equal protection issues remained constant for the
twenty-five years preceding the opinion. Part II analyzes the CODE,
CONTEXT, and MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia and considers
both the correct and incorrect interpretations of the MESSAGE. This
Note concludes by reviewing the implications of unnecessarily
changing the CODE used to convey a MESSAGE.
I. GENDER-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION BEFORE UNITED STATES
V. VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court did not recognize the application of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
governmental distinctions between men and women until the latter
part of the twentieth century. In 1971, the Supreme Court first struck
down a gender classification for denying equal protection of the laws
to women.24 Since then, the MESSAGE of the Court’s gender-based
equal protection cases has been consistent:25 gender classifications are
subject to intermediate scrutiny. The CODE used to convey this
MESSAGE has also been consistent. Since 1976, the CODE “substantial
relation to an important objective” has been used to convey the
MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny,26 and, since 1981, the CODE
“exceedingly persuasive justification” has been used interchangeably
with the more familiar CODE “substantial relation to an important
objective.”27 This consistency of MESSAGE and CODE reveals the
settled nature of the Court’s gender-based equal protection
jurisprudence at the time United States v. Virginia was decided.
offensive language.
24. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
25. By advocating the application of strict scrutiny to gender classifications, the plurality
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), represents the closest the Court has
come to deviating from its MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications. See
infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
26. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (initiating the use of the CODE
“substantial relation to an important objective”) .
27. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (equating the CODE “exceedingly
persuasive justification” with the CODE “substantial relation to an important objective”).
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A. Gender-Based Equal Protection Before the Articulation of
Intermediate Scrutiny
Congress clearly intended to address discrimination between
people of different races through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause,28 which declares that “[n]o State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”29 There is, however, no evidence that Congress intended to
address discrimination between people of different genders through
the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, it is not surprising that more than
100 years passed after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
before the Supreme Court recognized that gender classifications
discriminating between men and women could deny equal protection
of the laws to women.30
When challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, most
government action need only survive rational basis scrutiny, which
merely requires that a statute be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest.31 Indeed, rational basis scrutiny was applied in
equal protection cases involving gender classifications until late in the
twentieth century. An example of such an application is Goesaert v.
Cleary,32 decided in 1948. In Goesaert, the Court found a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause in a Michigan statute that prohibited all
women from tending bar except the daughters and wives of male bar
owners.33 Considering the CONTEXT of Goesaert—men returning to
their jobs from the battlefields of World War II and forcing women
from their war jobs back into the kitchen—it is not surprising that the
Court held that discriminating between men and women was not
problematic, but that discriminating between women was. The Court
stated that “[w]hile Michigan may deny to all women opportunities
for bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women
28. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866) (stating specifically that the
principal drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, Rep. John Bingham of New York, aimed his
proposal’s equal protection language at laws like the provision of the Oregon Constitution that
denied blacks access to the courts to enforce their rights).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding that a provision of the Idaho
probate code giving preference to men over women in appointments of estate administrators
violated the Equal Protection Clause). The Court has also recognized that gender
classifications could deny equal protection to men as well. See infra notes 43-53 and
accompanying text.
31. See supra note 8.
32. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
33. See id. at 465, 467.
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without rhyme or reason. The Constitution in enjoining the equal
protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination
as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law.”34
The Court thus interpreted gender discrimination to cover
discrimination within a single gender instead of between the two
genders.
The Supreme Court eventually confronted the issue of
discrimination between men and women in Reed v. Reed.35 In Reed,
the appellant challenged an Idaho law that provided that, in choosing
between people equally entitled to administer the estate of one who
dies intestate, men must be preferred over women.36 The Supreme
Court unanimously stated that the “mandatory preference” of the
Idaho law violated the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis
scrutiny:
A classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.” The question presented by
this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing
applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship
to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of
[the statute].37
34. Id. at 466.
35. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
36. See id. at 73 (discussing IDAHO CODE § 15-312 (1948)). The appellant was dissatisfied
with this law because it forced her to accept her estranged husband as the administrator of their
son’s estate. See id. at 71-73.
37. Id. at 76 (citation omitted) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920)). The primary argument of the Appellant’s Brief in Reed, written in part by
Ginsburg, was that the Court should make gender a suspect classification, see Brief for
Appellant at 5 (“The sex line drawn by [the Idaho statute], mandating subordination of women
to men without regard to individual capacity, creates a ‘suspect classification’ requiring close
judicial scrutiny.”), and apply strict scrutiny, see id. at 7 (“Idaho’s interest in administrative
convenience, served by excluding women who would compete with men for appointment as an
administrator, falls far short of a compelling state interest when appraised in light of the
interest of the class against which the statute discriminates . . . .”), which the Idaho statute
certainly could not pass. Only as a secondary argument did the Appellant’s Brief contend that
the Idaho statute could not pass even rational basis scrutiny like that imposed in Goesaert. See
id. at 60.
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This language—the CODE—is roughly the same as that used in
Goesaert,38 but the analysis actually applied in Reed—the MESSAGE—
is very different from that applied in Goesaert.39
Writing for the Reed Court, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged
that the law was justifiable: he found that it was rationally related to
the legitimate governmental interest of “reducing the workload on
probate courts by eliminating one class of contests.”40 The Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause violation arose only in “the
arbitrary preference [the statute] established in favor of males.”41
Despite the overwhelming similarity of Goesaert’s CODE to Reed’s,
the fact that the same kind of preference had been declared
permissible under rational basis scrutiny in Goesaert42 suggests that
the MESSAGE of Reed is that gender classifications would be
subjected to something stricter than rational basis scrutiny.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,43 a plurality of the
Court recognized the MESSAGE of Reed—that gender classifications
would be subject to a level of scrutiny that is stricter than mere
rational basis.44 In Frontiero, the appellant challenged the Air Force’s
differing definitions of “dependent” for male and female spouses of
officers.45 While eight Justices voted to overturn the district court’s
ruling,46 there was no majority opinion in Frontiero. Although the
Court’s lack of a majority opinion in Frontiero makes analysis of its
38. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466 (“The Constitution . . . precludes irrational
discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law.”); see also
supra text accompanying notes 32-34 (discussing the facts and CONTEXT of Goesaert).
39. While the CONTEXT of Reed—the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the pending
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment by Congress—made the change in the Court’s
MESSAGE foreseeable, even women’s rights advocates were not necessarily expecting the
change to occur in Reed. See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s
Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335, 342 (1992).
40. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
41. Id. at 74.
42. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
43. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
44. See id. at 684.
45. See id. at 679-80. In determining who was qualified to receive certain benefits, the Air
Force assumed the wife of a male officer to be a “dependent” while the husband of a female
officer had to rely on his wife for more than half of his support in order to be considered a
“dependent.” See id.
46. The three-judge Alabama district court held that the statutes did not
unconstitutionally discriminate against servicewomen. See Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201,
209 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, Marshall, Stewart, Powell, and
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger voted to overturn while only Justice Rehnquist voted to
affirm. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678, 691.
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MESSAGE and CODE difficult, the different opinions help reveal the
different lines of thought that existed in the Court at the time. The
four Justices who joined the plurality opinion, written by Justice
Brennan,47 accepted in Frontiero what the Court had not in Reed—
that gender classifications should be “suspect” and that they should
be subjected to strict scrutiny:
At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin,
are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny. We agree and, indeed, find at least implicit support
for such an approach in our unanimous decision only last Term in
Reed v. Reed.48
These four could not, however, persuade the other Justices to
accept this application of strict scrutiny to gender classifications. In
fact, two Justices failed even to discuss the giant step up to strict
scrutiny advocated by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion. Justice
Stewart stated his reasons for concurring in the judgment, though not
the opinion, of the plurality in a terse, one sentence statement: “Mr.
Justice STEWART concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the
statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Constitution.”49 Justice Stewart’s silence on the matter of the
plurality’s elevation of gender to a suspect classification indicates his
disapproval of the idea. Justice Rehnquist wrote an equally terse
dissent in which he disclosed his agreement with the district court
(and disagreement with the majority) while refraining from expressly
criticizing the plurality’s action.50
The three separately concurring Justices, however, gave voice to
their dissatisfaction with the plurality opinion. Writing for himself,
Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell stated:
I cannot join the opinion of Mr. Justice BRENNAN, which would
hold that all classifications based upon sex, ‘like classifications based
47. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678. Joining Justice Brennan’s opinion were Justices
Douglas, White, and Marshall. See id.
48. Id. at 682 (footnotes omitted). The “implicit support” in Justice Brennan’s plurality
opinion may refer to the arguments for the application of strict scrutiny to gender-based equal
protection issues made by the Appellant’s Brief in Reed. See supra note 37.
49. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (citing Reed). Given Justice Stewart’s citation to Reed, one
must assume he did not find the same implicit support in Reed for the application of strict
scrutiny to gender classifications that the plurality did.
50. See id. at 691 (“Mr. Justice REHNQUIST dissents for the reasons stated by Judge
Rives in his opinion for the District Court.”).
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upon race, alienage, and national origin,’ are ‘inherently suspect and
must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.’ It is
unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a
suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such
a holding. . . . In my view, we can and should decide this case on the
authority of Reed and reserve for the future any expansion of its
rationale.51
This concurrence thus advocated judicial restraint: the concurring
Justices would have decided the case on the basis of Reed rather than
through an application of strict scrutiny.
While Justice Powell’s concurrence argued for deciding
Frontiero on the basis of the Court’s decision in Reed, it did not
foreclose the possibility that strict scrutiny would be applied to
gender classifications at some point in the future. The CONTEXT of
this possibility must be understood, though. By the time Frontiero
was decided, Congress had passed the Equal Rights Amendment,
which would have made gender a suspect classification, and had sent
it to the states for ratification.52 Justice Powell expressed the opinion
that declaring gender a suspect classification was properly a political
process and that the Constitution actually required no more than the
application of Reed rational basis scrutiny.53 Thus, the MESSAGE of
Frontiero seems to be that the appropriate level of scrutiny for
gender classifications lies somewhere between rational basis scrutiny
and strict scrutiny.
51. Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted). Indeed, Reed provided the Court with precedent for
overturning the district court’s decision due to the fact that the differing definitions of
“dependent” drew an unnecessary and arbitrary distinction between men and women and, thus,
violated the Equal Protection Clause. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. Following
the logic of Reed, legitimate reasons for the differing definitions could include the decrease in
inquiries regarding who was really a dependent and the savings in money spent on spousal
benefits. These reasons may have even been important, as required under intermediate
scrutiny, but, if so, they do not seem substantially related to the different definitions.
52. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692.
53. See id. (“It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major
political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect
for duly prescribed legislative processes.”). Of course, the Equal Rights Amendment was never
ratified, see Alison Muscatine, Is NOW Pulling the Chair Out from Under Feminism?, WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 1984, at D1, and no member of the Court has ever again voted to subject gender
classifications to strict scrutiny. See infra Parts I.B-C.
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B. The Articulation of Intermediate Scrutiny
Although the MESSAGES of Reed and Frontiero had required the
application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to gender
classifications, the Court had neither put a label on this new level of
constitutional scrutiny nor attempted to explain it. In Craig v.
Boren,54 the Court settled on a CODE and explained the CODE’s
MESSAGE. The appellants55 in Craig challenged an Oklahoma statute
that prohibited the sale of low alcohol content beer to women below
the age of eighteen and to men below the age of twenty-one.56 Based
on the appellee’s statistical evidence of young men’s drunk-driving
arrests and vehicular injuries, the district court concluded that the
statute was substantially related to the achievement of greater safety
on the highways of Oklahoma.57 Although the district court correctly
asserted that Reed’s “fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation”58 test was controlling, it ignored the MESSAGE behind that
CODE, as well as the MESSAGE in Frontiero, and upheld the statute.59
The Supreme Court refused to find the challenged law to be
substantially related to Oklahoma’s highway safety. Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan matter-of-factly recited Reed’s CODE with
one significant addition—the word “important”: “To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”60 These
words became the CODE used to convey the MESSAGE of an
intermediate level of scrutiny, somewhere between rational basis
scrutiny and strict scrutiny—a MESSAGE the Court had been sending
since Reed.61
While the Court had applied an intermediate level of scrutiny
since Reed, it had theretofore officially acknowledged only two levels
of scrutiny: rational basis scrutiny, to which the bulk of all legislation
was subjected, and strict scrutiny, to which only racial and religious
54. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
55. The appellants were a bartender and a man between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age. See id. at 192.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 199.
58. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920)).
59. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199.
60. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
61. See supra Part I.A.
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classifications were subjected.62 By failing to acknowledge the
existence of the different standard of scrutiny applied in Reed and
Frontiero with a new CODE, the Court had also failed to fully explain
this standard. Although Craig’s CODE differed from Reed’s63 only in
the addition of the word “important,” the Court used this difference
as an opportunity to recognize and explain this intermediate level of
scrutiny. The Court explained what its intent was in using the word
“important” by pointing out that the “[d]ecisions following Reed . . .
have rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently
important objectives to justify gender-based classifications.”64 The
Court also took the opportunity to further clarify Craig’s MESSAGE
by explaining what it meant by “substantial relation”:
“[A]rchaic and overbroad” generalizations concerning the financial
position of servicewomen and working women could not justify use
of a gender line in determining eligibility for certain governmental
entitlements. Similarly, increasingly outdated misconceptions
concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the
“marketplace and world of ideas” were rejected as loose-fitting
characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes
that were premised upon their accuracy. In light of the weak
congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that
gender purported to represent, it was necessary that the legislatures
choose either to realign their substantive laws in a gender-neutral
fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where
the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact.65
The Court’s MESSAGE here is that intermediate scrutiny requires
gender classifications to be substantially related to an important
governmental interest. Indeed, even though Justice Rehnquist
disagreed with the application of this intermediate level of scrutiny in
Craig because the law challenged in that case seemed to discriminate
against men and in favor of women, he did not disagree with the
Court’s recognition of “an elevated or ‘intermediate’ level
scrutiny . . . in cases dealing with discrimination against females.”66
62. See supra Part I.A.
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
64. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198.
65. Id. at 198-99 (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 508 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1974)).
66. Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Other Justices did not agree with the application of this
intermediate level of scrutiny. Though silent on the majority’s
articulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard, Chief Justice
Burger lodged his objection by simply stating in his dissent that he
could find no “independent constitutional basis supporting the right
asserted [by the appellants] or disfavoring the classification adopted”
by Oklahoma.67 Justices Powell and Stevens, on the other hand,
directly addressed the Court’s recognition of a new level of scrutiny.
Although he joined the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell asserted
that the Court’s “decision today will be viewed by some as a ‘middle-
tier’ approach” and refused to “endorse that characterization.”68 He
did, however, admit that “candor compels the recognition” that
gender classifications were being subjected to a higher standard of
review than the rational basis scrutiny that was normally applied.69 In
his concurrence, Justice Stevens expressed his disagreement with the
majority’s new CODE—or with any CODE that recognized different
levels of scrutiny—more strongly, declaring:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one
standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other
cases. Whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion
implying that there are at least three such standards applies with the
same force to a double standard.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-
tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a
completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method
the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a
single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.70
Although Justice Stevens objected to the CODE that the majority
used to explain the Court’s gender-based equal protection
jurisprudence, he weakened the force of his objection by not
proposing an alternate CODE to explain what he saw as a single
standard.
Despite the objections of three members of the Craig Court,
intermediate scrutiny has since proven to be very workable. The
67. Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 211 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
BOWSHER FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/11/99 11:58 AM
318 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:305
Court has repeatedly applied the standard expressed in Craig without
any further changes to the MESSAGE.71
C. The Birth of “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” and Its
Incorporation into the CODE of Intermediate Scrutiny
Although the Court did not change its MESSAGE of intermediate
scrutiny after its decision in Craig, it did subsequently add to the
CODE it used in Craig. The Court continued to use the CODE
“substantial relation to an important governmental objective” to
refer to the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny, but the Court also
began to use the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification”
interchangeably with the CODE “substantial relation to an important
governmental objective.”
The link between the CODE “exceedingly persuasive
justification” and the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny took time to
develop, though. When first used by the Court in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney,72 the phrase was used simply to point out the
difficulty that a gender classification faced in surviving intermediate
scrutiny.73 If the Court had intended its use of “exceedingly
persuasive justification” in Feeney to signal a shift in its CODE or
MESSAGE, then such a shift should have been reflected ten months
later when the Court decided the gender-based equal protection case
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.74 No such shift occurred in
Wengler as the Court simply recited the already solidly established
“substantial relation to an important governmental interest” CODE
71. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977); see also infra Part I.C
(discussing cases after Craig).
72. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
73. The majority opinion states:
This Court’s recent cases teach that such [gender] classifications must bear a close
and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, and are in many
settings unconstitutional. Although public employment is not a constitutional
right . . . these precedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to
prefer males over females in public employment would require an exceedingly
persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 273 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court did not actually apply intermediate
scrutiny in Feeney, however, because it found no overt or covert gender classifications. See id.
at 274-76 (noting no gender classification and proceeding with an invidious intent inquiry).
74. 446 U.S. 142 (1980). Wengler dealt with a workers’ compensation law that paid
benefits to all widows but only to those widowers who could demonstrate need. See id. at 149.
BOWSHER FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/11/99 11:58 AM
1998] CRACKING THE CODE 319
for intermediate scrutiny and did not mention “exceedingly
persuasive justification.”75
The majority opinion in Kirchberg v. Feenstra76 gave the CODE
“exceedingly persuasive justification” its first bit of real meaning by
equating it with intermediate scrutiny. In an opinion written by
Justice Marshall, the Court stated that the answer to the “critical
question” of “[w]hether [the gender classification] substantially
furthers an important government interest”77 could be gleaned by
asking whether the “party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly
discriminates on the basis of sex” had borne “the burden [of]
advanc[ing] an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the
challenged classification.”78 In other words, the two differently
CODED questions have the same MESSAGE, and the CODE
“advanc[ing] an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” is just
shorthand for the longer CODE “substantially further[ing] an
important governmental interest.”79 The Court further reinforced
these CODES’ interchangeability by discussing the statute’s failure to
pass intermediate scrutiny in terms of both.80
Although the Court did use a new CODE to convey the MESSAGE
of intermediate scrutiny in Kirchberg, the Court did not change that
MESSAGE. The Kirchberg Court was the first to explicitly recognize
that gender classifications are presumptively invalid,81 but this
presumption had been an implicit part of the MESSAGE of
75. See id. at 150 (recognizing that “our precedents require that gender-based
discriminations must serve important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives”).
Indeed, the Wengler Court’s rejection of Missouri’s administrative convenience justification
demonstrated complete adherence to the MESSAGE of Reed and Craig, which also recognized
that administrative convenience is not a governmental objective sufficiently important to justify
discrimination between men and women. See id. at 151-52; Craig, 429 U.S. at 198; Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
76. 450 U.S. 455 (1981). At issue in Kirchberg was a Louisiana statute that gave husbands,
but not wives, the unilateral right to dispose of property owned jointly by the couple on the
theory that husbands were the “head and master” of such property. Id. at 456.
77. Id. at 461.
78. Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 460 (holding that “appellant Kirchberg does not claim that the provision [of
the statute] serves any such interest,” meaning an important governmental interest); id. at 461
(holding that “appellant has failed to offer such a justification,” meaning an “exceedingly
persuasive justification”).
81. See id. at 461 (“[T]he burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that
expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’
for the challenged classification.”).
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intermediate scrutiny at least since Craig. While rational basis
scrutiny presumes laws to be valid,82 the Court ceased applying
rational basis scrutiny to gender classifications in Reed.83 In Craig, the
Court actually shifted the burden of proof to the state, without
explicitly recognizing the shift, by not assessing the adequacy of the
appellant’s arguments and, instead, focusing on the inadequacy of the
state’s.84 Thus, although the Kirchberg Court was the first to explicitly
recognize this shift, the shift itself had probably occurred several
years earlier.
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan85 confirmed the interchangeability of the more
familiar CODE used to express intermediate scrutiny, “substantial
relation to an important governmental objective,” and the newer
CODE, “exceedingly persuasive justification.” Finding that a man
could not be denied admission to a state-supported nursing school
because of his gender, Justice O’Connor explained the Court’s test as
follows:
Our decisions also establish that the party seeking to uphold a
statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must
carry the burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for the classification. The burden is met only by
showing at least that the classification serves “important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”86
But for the “at least,” which had been implicit in intermediate
scrutiny, the CODE used in Hogan is identical to that used in
Kirchberg.87
82. See supra note 8.
83. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
84. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976).
85. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
86. Id. at 724 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Kirchberg, 450
U.S. at 461; Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Wengler v. Druggists Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
87. Compare id., with Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (holding that the
“critical question” of “[w]hether [the gender classification] substantially furthers an important
government interest” could be gleaned by asking whether the “party seeking to uphold a
statute that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex” had borne “the burden [of] advanc[ing]
an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the challenged classification”). This confirmation of
the CODES’ interchangeability may be called into question, however, by a footnote following
the quotation above. Hearkening back to Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero, the
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As applied in Hogan, the MESSAGE of the CODE “exceedingly
persuasive justification” does not differ from the MESSAGE of the
CODE “substantial relation to an important governmental objective”
as applied in Kirchberg and Craig. In considering whether
“compensat[ion] for discrimination against women and, therefore, . . .
educational affirmative action” justified the state university’s
discriminatory admissions policy,88 the Hogan Court concluded that
“although the State recited a ‘benign, compensatory purpose,’ it
failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual purpose
underlying the discriminatory classification.”89 This statement was
nothing more than a recognition that Mississippi had not satisfied its
burden under the intermediate scrutiny standard, just as the
appellant had failed to do in Kirchberg.90 The Court further held that
Mississippi University for Women’s admissions policy was invalid
because it was not “substantially . . . related to its proposed
compensatory objective,”91 again echoing the traditional CODE of
intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny
remained consistent in Hogan.
The Court took a less clear stance in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B.,92 the next case in which the Court used the CODE “exceedingly
persuasive justification.”93 Although it set forth the intermediate
scrutiny standard using both CODES,94 the J.E.B. Court discussed
Court stated that “we need not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently
suspect.” Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9; see also supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text. This
statement can be interpreted in two ways: either the Court felt it was well-settled by that time
that gender was not a suspect classification requiring the application of strict scrutiny or the
Court was willing to consider applying strict scrutiny to gender at some point in the future.
Hogan’s MESSAGE suggests that the former interpretation is correct.
88. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
89. Id. at 730.
90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
91. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
92. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
93. The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by the Alabama
prosecutor’s purposeful use of peremptory strikes to exclude women from a jury solely on the
basis of their gender. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31.
94. See id. at 136-37 (“Under our equal protection jurisprudence, gender-based
classifications require ‘an exceedingly persuasive justification’ in order to survive constitutional
scrutiny. Thus, the only question is whether discrimination on the basis of gender in jury
selection substantially furthers the State’s legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial
trial.” (citing Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724;
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981))); see also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying
text (analyzing the original quotations from the Hogan and Kirchberg rulings). While the Court
does use the word “legitimate” to describe Alabama’s interest in “achieving a fair and
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whether Alabama’s actions passed that scrutiny only in terms of
Alabama’s “exceedingly persuasive justification” (or the lack
thereof).95 Thus, while previous opinions had always explained the
failure of gender classifications to pass intermediate scrutiny in terms
of the CODE “substantial relation to an important governmental
objective,” the majority opinion in J.E.B. was the first to use only the
CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification” to explain this failure.
Although the J.E.B. Court may have shifted its emphasis from
the CODE “substantial relation to an important governmental
objective” to the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification,” the
J.E.B. Court did not change the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny.
In considering Alabama’s arguments, the Court stated: “We shall not
accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges ‘the very
stereotype the law condemns.’”96 The similarity of this statement to
the Craig Court’s earlier rejection of “‘archaic and overbroad’
generalizations concerning the financial position of servicewomen
and working women” and “outdated misconceptions concerning the
role of females”97 suggests that the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny
had remained consistent, though no firm conclusion can be drawn
given the relative lack of explanation of the Court’s equal protection
analysis in this case.98
impartial trial,” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136-37, it probably did not intend to weaken the
intermediate scrutiny standard by requiring only legitimate instead of important governmental
interests.
95. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 (holding that Alabama’s arguments that women on juries
might be more sympathetic to female complainants fell “[f]ar from proffering an exceptionally
persuasive justification for its gender-based peremptory challenges”). Presumably by mistake,
the Court used the word “exceptionally” instead of “exceedingly.” It is unclear why the Court
made this and other simple linguistic mistakes. See also supra note 94 (discussing the Court’s
use of the word “legitimate” instead of the word “important”).
96. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
97. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976) (citations omitted) (quoting Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
98. It was, perhaps, because the majority opinion lacked a clear definition of “exceedingly
persuasive justification” that Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, did not object to that phrase as the correct expression of “the ‘heightened
scrutiny’ mode of equal protection analysis used for sex-based discrimination.” J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 160-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He focused, instead, on the differences between peremptory
strikes based on race, which he viewed as impermissible, and peremptory strikes based on
gender, which he considered permissible. See id. at 159-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It was not
until United States v. Virginia that Scalia or any of the other J.E.B. dissenters challenged the
use of the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification.” See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 570-76 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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II. “EXCEEDINGLY PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION,” “SKEPTICAL
SCRUTINY,” AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN UNITED STATES V.
VIRGINIA
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Virginia,
holding that VMI’s exclusion of women violated the Equal Protection
Clause.99 This decision spawned new questions about the level of
scrutiny to be applied to gender classifications.100 As explained in Part
I, the MESSAGE of the Court’s previous gender-based equal
protection cases had been clear: gender classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny. The United States v. Virginia Court seemed to
call this MESSAGE into question by emphasizing the CODE
“exceedingly persuasive justification” instead of the CODE
“substantial relation to an important governmental objective” and by
introducing the new CODE “skeptical scrutiny” as a description of its
analysis.
The case originated when the United States sued Virginia
alleging that Virginia’s use of state funds to support VMI, a public
military college that only admitted men, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.101 The original
judgment of the district court in favor of VMI’s admissions policy102
was vacated on appeal.103 On remand to the district court, Virginia
asked for and received the court’s approval of continued use of state
funds at VMI in exchange for creating and funding a separate but
similar institution for women, the Virginia Women’s Institute for
Leadership (VWIL).104 The creation of VWIL was, at best, a poor
attempt to remedy VMI’s discriminatory admissions policy: VWIL
lacked VMI’s high level of funding, VMI’s strong alumni network,
VMI’s distinctive adversative environment,105 and VMI’s
99. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
100. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing scholars and judges who saw the
majority opinion in United States v. Virginia as calling into question intermediate scrutiny’s
application to gender classifications).
101. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991).
102. See id.
103. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992).
104. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 484-85 (W.D. Va. 1994). VWIL would
have been located at nearby Mary Baldwin College, a private women’s liberal arts college. See
id.
105. VMI’s adversative method of leadership training involved grueling physical and
mental testing. See VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE: THE SPIRIT 61 (Virginia Military Institute
Sesquicentennial Committee ed., 1989) (quoting Lieutenant General Edward West Nichols’
description of the cadets’ psychology and experience). The goal of the adversative method is to
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independence.106 In considering this remedial plan on appeal, the
Fourth Circuit applied what it called a “special intermediate scrutiny
test.”107 The test determined:
(1) whether the state’s objective of providing single-gender
education to its citizens may be considered a legitimate and
important governmental objective; (2) whether the gender
classification adopted is directly and substantially related to that
purpose; and (3) whether the resulting mutual exclusion of women
and men from each other’s institutions leaves open opportunities for
those excluded to obtain substantively comparable benefits at their
institution or through other means offered by the state.108
Despite VWIL’s obvious inferiority to VMI, the Fourth Circuit held
that Virginia’s remedial plan passed the “special intermediate
scrutiny test”109 and affirmed the second judgment of the district
court.110 Judge Phillips dissented vigorously, arguing that the majority
had improperly abandoned the appropriate level of scrutiny for
gender classifications, by applying a more deferential level of scrutiny
than the intermediate scrutiny expressed in Craig and Hogan.111 After
the Fourth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc,112 the United States
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.113
Justice Ginsburg authored the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the
judgment of the Court but wrote separately, and Justice Scalia filed a
dissent. Justice Thomas did not take part in the consideration or
break all cadets down to an equal level in order to build them back together as a unit, creating
camaraderie and team spirit through adversity. See id. at 45 (“It matters not under what
adventitious circumstances you may have come here—of wealth, or family, or association—
every prop is now wrested from you but that which supports your own merits—your personal,
individual action and desert . . . .” (quoting Francis H. Smith, The Inner Life of the VMI Cadet,
Address to the Corps (September 10, 1866))). This adversative method understandably
inspired both love and loathing: life at VMI “is a life characterized by former cadets as one
they would not take a million dollars for having lived, and wouldn’t take a million dollars to go
through again.” Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HENRY A. WISE,
DRAWING OUT THE MAN: THE VMI STORY (1978)).
106. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 551-54 (1996).
107. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1241-42.
111. See id. at 1244 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
112. See United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995).
113. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996).
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decision of the case.114 Before moving to the heart of its equal
protection analysis, the Court criticized the Fourth Circuit’s inquiry
for being too deferential.115 The Court also praised Judge Phillips’s
dissent from the Fourth Circuit’s decision as well as Judge Motz’s
dissent from the Fourth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, both of
which used the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification” to
express the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny.116
A. The CONTEXT of the Majority Opinion
Many elements of the majority opinion’s CONTEXT influence the
understanding of United States v. Virginia’s MESSAGE. Those scholars
who have misinterpreted the majority opinion’s MESSAGE and who
have considered the CONTEXT of the majority opinion have focused
on the status of the majority opinion’s author as a well-known
women’s rights advocate.117 They consider this element of the
opinion’s CONTEXT to indicate that Justice Ginsburg’s agenda
includes changing the Court’s MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny for
gender classifications.118
Before being appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 1980,119 Ginsburg
was one of the most influential participants in the fight for women’s
equal protection under the law.120 In fact, when the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) agreed to represent the appellant in Reed,
114. The reason Justice Thomas did not participate in United States v. Virginia was,
presumably, because his son was a recent graduate of VMI. See Donald P. Baker, By One Vote,
VMI Decides to Go Coed; Nation’s Last All-Male Military School to Enroll Women Starting in
‘97, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A1.
115. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 528.
116. See id. at 529-30 (noting that Judge Phillips felt that “[t]he court . . . had not held
Virginia to the burden of showing an ‘“exceedingly persuasive [justification]”’ for the
Commonwealth’s action” and that “Judge Motz agreed with Judge Phillips that Virginia had
not shown an ‘“exceedingly persuasive justification”’ for the disparate opportunities the
Commonwealth supported” (second alteration in original) (quoting respectively United States
v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1247 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) and United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d at 92 (Motz, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724)).
117. See, e.g., Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1333-34 (pointing to Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in United States v. Virginia as a significant moment in feminist jurisprudence because it
articulates a more stringent equal protection test for gender classifications); Udell, supra note
17, at 550-56 (characterizing Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion as a positive step in her
strategic plan to push gender classifications into the realm of strict scrutiny).
118. See Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1334; Udell, supra note 17, at 550-56.
119. See Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment,
26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
120. See Markowitz, supra note 39, at 335.
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she collaborated with the ACLU lawyers on the appellant’s brief.121
After the unanimous decision in Reed, the ACLU formed its
Women’s Rights Project and named Ginsburg its first director.122
As director, Ginsburg wrote and filed amici briefs for several of
the landmark gender-based equal protection cases. In Frontiero, for
example, it was the Ginsburg-authored amicus brief, not the
appellant’s brief, that pressed the strict scrutiny arguments ultimately
adopted by Justice Brennan’s plurality.123 Ginsburg also wrote an
amicus brief in Craig,124 and she corresponded extensively with the
Craig appellants’ local attorney.125 In fact, it was Ginsburg who
actually made the suggestion that, given the Court’s rejection of strict
scrutiny in Frontiero only three years earlier, the Craig appellants
should abandon their arguments for strict scrutiny and focus, instead,
on a form of nonstrict, but still heightened scrutiny.126
In focusing on the CONTEXT of Justice Ginsburg’s work as an
advocate, those who have misinterpreted the majority opinion’s
MESSAGE have ignored the CONTEXT of her work as a judge, which
does not suggest that Justice Ginsburg desires to heighten the
standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications. As a judge on
the D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg did not behave like an activist.127
The opinions she authored “did not indicate that she presented a
crusading liberal lawyer’s views.”128 Quite to the contrary,
commentators saw her as a swing vote, siding with Republican-
appointed judges (presumably more conservative) as often as, if not
121. See Brief for Appellant at 68, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
122. See Markowitz, supra note 39, at 337.
123. See id. at 344-46.
124. See Brief Amicus Curiae for ACLU at 34, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (No. 75-
628).
125. See Markowitz, supra note 39, at 355.
126. See id.
127. Taking Justice Ginsburg’s actions on the D.C. Circuit as a reflection of her true
feelings about gender-based equal protection might be a mistake, though. First, she did not
hear many cases involving gender discrimination and heard none involving gender-based equal
protection issues. See, e.g., Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56 (1982) (settling
an allegation of a Title VII sex discrimination suit without mentioning the Court’s gender-
based equal protection jurisprudence). Second, one might speculate that as an intermediate
court, a federal court of appeals is not an appropriate or advisable forum for the advancement
of an agenda. Judge Ginsburg may have felt that any heightening of scrutiny on her part would
weaken her credibility with her colleagues on the D.C. Circuit and force the Supreme Court
into explicitly rejecting strict scrutiny for gender classifications once again. As the highest
constitutional authority, though, the U.S. Supreme Court is actually a forum from which an
agenda can be advanced, although the appropriateness of doing so is questionable.
128. Baugh et al., supra note 119, at 4.
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more often than, with Democrat-appointed judges (presumably more
liberal).129 Indeed, the only real indication in Ginsburg’s opinions that
she might have been open to reformulating the Court’s three-tiered
equal protection analysis came in Federal Election Commission v.
International Funding Institute, Inc.130 In her concurrence, Judge
Ginsburg referred with approval to Justice Stevens’ comment in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.131 that the “Court’s equal
protection decisions ‘reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to
differing classifications’ rather than three discrete ‘tiers’ of
scrutiny.”132 Other than this reference, though, Judge Ginsburg’s
opinions do not suggest that she disagreed with the Court’s gender-
based equal protection jurisprudence.133
Once she was appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg
gave only one hint of dissatisfaction with intermediate scrutiny being
applied to gender classifications. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,134
a Title VII case, Justice Ginsburg remarked in a footnote that
“[i]ndeed, even under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
which requires ‘an exceedingly persuasive justification’ for a gender-
based classification, it remains an open question whether
‘classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.’”135 As one
commentator remarked, Justice Ginsburg “used a single footnote to
raise what may be a more significant point for future constitutional
cases and for Ginsburg’s role on the Court.”136 In United States v.
Virginia, however, Justice Ginsburg did not address this issue at all.
In interpreting the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia,
considering the CONTEXT of Justice Ginsburg’s authorship of the
majority opinion is warranted. Considering only one part of this
129. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Clinton’s Choice Would Probably Strengthen the Court’s
Center, WASH. POST NAT’L WKLY. EDITION, June 21-27, 1993, at 7.
130. 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
131. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
132. International Funding Inst., 969 F.2d at 1118 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at
451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
133. At that time, the relevant jurisprudence entailed the application of intermediate
scrutiny to gender classifications, as seen in the previous discussions of Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, and
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. See supra Part I.C.
134. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
135. Id. at 26 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting respectively
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) and Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982)).
136. Baugh et al., supra note 119, at 28.
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CONTEXT, however, is unwarranted. Justice Ginsburg’s work as an
advocate suggests that she may still have a desire to further heighten
the standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications. Justice
Ginsburg’s work as a judge, however, suggests that she has
abandoned any former desire to heighten the standard of scrutiny
applied to gender classifications. Taking into account both Justice
Ginsburg’s work as an advocate and her work as a judge, the
CONTEXT of her authoring the majority opinion is inconclusive and
does not shed any significant light on the true MESSAGE of United
States v. Virginia.
B. The CODE of the Majority Opinion
Before reviewing the state of its gender-based equal protection
analysis, the United States v. Virginia Court referred to the inquiry it
was about to undertake as “skeptical scrutiny.”137 This CODE had
never been used before and was part of the reason for the subsequent
confusion as to the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia.138 Because
the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to require different
levels of constitutional “scrutiny” to be applied to different kinds of
government action—rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
and strict scrutiny—the Court’s use of the CODE “skeptical scrutiny”
has been interpreted as creating a new level of constitutional
scrutiny.139
Although the CODE “skeptical scrutiny” had not appeared in a
Supreme Court opinion previously, the manner in which that CODE
was used in United States v. Virginia suggests that it was meant
merely to describe intermediate scrutiny. First, the CODE was used
only one time, not repeatedly. Second, the CODE was used to refer to
the inquiry actually undertaken by the Court in United States v.
Virginia,140 an inquiry that, while “skeptical,” was nothing more than
intermediate scrutiny. For the twenty years that preceded this case,
the Supreme Court had been skeptical of gender classifications.141
Indeed, the Court had fully acknowledged that skepticism fifteen
137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
138. See, e.g., Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1334 (discussing the “new” equal protection
standard of “skeptical scrutiny” for gender classifications articulated by Justice Ginsburg in the
majority opinion).
139. See id.
140. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (“Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official
action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.”).
141. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
BOWSHER FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/11/99 11:58 AM
1998] CRACKING THE CODE 329
years before United States v. Virginia by expressly shifting to the state
the burden of proving the validity of a gender classification.142 The
CODE “skeptical scrutiny” should not be interpreted as anything but a
new way of describing intermediate scrutiny.
After referring to “skeptical scrutiny,” the Court defined the
level of scrutiny appropriate for gender-based equal protection using
familiar CODES, albeit with a different emphasis. The Court noted
“the core instructions of this Court’s pathmarking decisions in J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and Mississippi University for Women: Parties
who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that
action.”143 At only two points does the majority opinion contain the
CODE “substantial relation to an important governmental
objective.”144 For the remainder of the opinion, VMI’s admissions
policy is considered in terms of the CODE “exceedingly persuasive
justification.”145 For example, the Court found that “[t]he State’s
justification for excluding all women from ‘citizen-soldier’ training
for which some are qualified, in any event, cannot rank as
‘exceedingly persuasive,’ as we have explained and applied that
standard.”146 The Court went on to hold that “Virginia, in sum, ‘has
fallen far short of establishing the exceedingly persuasive
justification’ that must be the solid base for any gender-defined
classification.”147
Several scholars, and even some judges, have interpreted the
Court’s emphasis on the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification”
to indicate a heightening of the level of scrutiny applied to gender
classifications.148 This interpretation, however, ignores the Court’s
own definition of the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification.”
The Court explained the requirements of demonstrating such a
justification:
Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for
which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether
the proffered justification is “exceedingly persuasive.” The burden
142. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
143. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (citations omitted).
144. See id. at 524, 533.
145. See id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting nine invocations of the CODE “exceedingly
persuasive justification” by the majority).
146. Id. at 545.
147. Id. at 546 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982)).
148. See infra Part II.C.1.
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of justification is demanding and rests entirely on the State. The
State must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.”149
Each part of the United States v. Virginia Court’s definition of
“exceedingly persuasive justification” is based directly on fourteen
years or more of Supreme Court doctrine. In describing its task as
“determin[ing] whether the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly
persuasive,’”150 the Court was simply repeating what it had said
earlier in Hogan151 and in J.E.B.152 By recognizing the “skeptical”
nature of intermediate scrutiny and pointing out that “[t]he burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State,”153 the
United States v. Virginia Court thus reiterated what the Kirchberg
Court had acknowledged154 and what had been part of the Supreme
Court’s MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny at least since Craig.155
Moreover, the Court’s practice of supplying an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for a gender classification along with proof
that the “‘classification serves important governmental objectives
and . . . the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives’”156 had been implicit since
Kirchberg157 and explicit since Hogan.158 While language is mutable
and old CODES can be used to convey new MESSAGES, the absolute
consistency of the United States v. Virginia Court’s definition of
“exceedingly persuasive justification” with intermediate scrutiny does
not suggest a change in the Court’s MESSAGE of intermediate
scrutiny for gender classifications.
149. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
150. Id. at 533.
151. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
152. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994); see also supra notes 94-
97 and accompanying text.
153. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
154. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1981); see also supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
156. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
157. See Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 460-61; see also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
158. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; see also supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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C. The MESSAGE of the Majority Opinion
1. The Incorrect MESSAGE. Many of the scholars and some of the
judges to consider the issue have either misinterpreted or expressed
confusion as to the actual MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia.
Misinterpretation has come, for the most part, from the scholars.
Some scholars have argued that the MESSAGE of United States v.
Virginia is that gender classifications may be subject to strict
scrutiny.159 Other scholars have suggested that the majority opinion in
United States v. Virginia reveals the Court’s intention to create a new
level of scrutiny somewhere between intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny.160
More troubling than misinterpretation of United States v.
Virginia’s MESSAGE by scholars, however, is its misinterpretation by
judges. In reviewing the current state of the law in Montgomery v.
Carr,161 the Sixth Circuit described United States v. Virginia as
“appearing to create a new standard of review for gender-based
classifications, requiring an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ on
the part of the governmental actor.”162 Luckily, this statement is
nothing more than dicta since the Sixth Circuit did not have to apply
this new standard in Montgomery.163 The fact that the Sixth Circuit
handed down this decision so soon (six months) after the Court’s
decision in United States v. Virginia suggests that the CODE and
CONTEXT of United States v. Virginia, rather than the scholarly
confusion associated with it, were responsible for the Sixth Circuit’s
misinterpretation.
159. See, e.g., Corcoran, supra note 17, at 1010 (noting that the majority’s use of the phrase
“exceedingly persuasive justification” indicates “that the Court might have applied a
heightened form of intermediate scrutiny or, perhaps, even strict scrutiny”).
160. See, e.g., Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 17, at 870; Corcoran, supra note 17, at 1010;
Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1334; Udell, supra note 17, at 553. Whether or not such a standard is
consistent with the Court’s gender-based equal protection jurisprudence, it would probably not
prove articulable. Although changing the CODE used to express the MESSAGE of intermediate
scrutiny is all too easily done, creating a new standard of scrutiny between intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny would be difficult. To meet this hypothetical standard, a gender
classification would have to serve governmental interests that were more than important but
less than compelling, and the classification would have to be more than substantially related to
those governmental interests but less than narrowly tailored to them. Distinguishing between
the MESSAGES of the three tiers of the Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence is
difficult enough, but adding the MESSAGE of a fourth might blur the lines between each tier to
the point that application was impossible.
161. 101 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996).
162. Id. at 1123.
163. See id. at 1129-30 (applying rational basis scrutiny instead).
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Other scholars164 and judges have merely admitted confusion
over the majority opinion’s intended MESSAGE. In Engineering
Contractors Ass’n v. Metropolitan Dade County,165 United States
District Judge Ryskamp examined the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in United States v. Virginia and expressed his uncertainty as
to the Court’s MESSAGE:
This Court cannot say for certain whether the Supreme Court
intended that the VMI decision signal a heightening in scrutiny of
gender-based classifications. That issue is not dispositive of the
instant case. Because the Court finds that the WBE [Women
Business Enterprise] program fails even intermediate scrutiny, it is
unnecessary to decide whether the VMI decision requires the
County to meet an even more difficult burden of proof.166
In this opinion, handed down only three months after the Court
released United States v. Virginia, Judge Ryskamp’s relief at not
having to discern and apply the real MESSAGE of United States v.
Virginia is almost palpable.167
Scholarly confusion may have played a more significant role in
United States District Judge Glasser’s opinion in North Shore
Concrete & Associates, Inc. v. City of New York,168 decided in April
1998, after many scholars had commented on United States v.
Virginia.169 Mirroring Judge Ryskamp’s conclusion in Engineering
Contractors, Judge Glasser also professed confusion as to the
MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia:
164. See, e.g., Raffi S. Baroutjian, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of
Equal Protection Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with
Romer v. Evans, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1277, 1324 (1997) (arguing that the Court “blurred the
parameters of the intermediate standard of equal protection review in United States v.
Virginia”); John Dayton & Anne P. Dupre, Equal Protection of the Laws: Recent Judicial
Decisions and Their Implications for Public Educational Institutions, 114 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 14-
15 (1997) (noting the destabilizing effect of United States v. Virginia on the Court’s gender-
based equal protection jurisprudence); Lee, supra note 17, at 622.
165. 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (striking down an affirmative action program
used to give construction contracts to women- and minority-owned businesses).
166. Id. at 1556.
167. The Eleventh Circuit later clarified the state of the law when it reviewed this case. See
infra note 172.
168. No. 94 CV.4017, 1998 WL 273027, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1998) (considering a
summary judgment motion in a constitutional challenge to New York City’s practice of
awarding contracts based on an affirmative action program).
169. See, e.g., Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 17; Kupetz, supra note 17; Udell, supra, note
17.
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[T]he recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Virginia, has
called the use of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based distinctions
into question by using an “exceedingly persuasive justification”
standard in invalidating the Virginia Military Institute program.
Regardless, since this court finds that the City’s M/WBE [minority-
and women-owned business enterprise] program withstands strict
scrutiny, at least on this motion for summary judgment, the gender-
based component will not be addressed separately.170
Thus, Judge Glasser appeared to blame his uncertainty on the
Court’s overuse of the CODE “exceedingly persuasive justification.”
Given Judge Glasser’s uncertainty as to the appropriate level of
scrutiny for gender classifications, it was fortuitous that he did not
have to address “the gender-based component . . . separately.”171
2. The Correct MESSAGE. Taking into account the settled
nature of the Supreme Court’s gender-based equal protection
jurisprudence before United States v. Virginia, the full CONTEXT of
Justice Ginsburg’s authorship of the opinion, the particular CODES
used in the majority opinion, the manner in which the Court
examined VMI’s admissions policy, and the political realities facing
the Court, the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia is no different
from that of the Court’s earlier gender-based equal protection cases:
gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Indeed,
five of the six federal Courts of Appeals to consider United States v.
Virginia’s MESSAGE have come to this conclusion.172
170. North Shore Concrete & Assoc., Inc., 1998 WL 273027, at *3 (citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. The First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all concluded that the
MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia is that gender classifications are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. In deciding the landmark Title IX case Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155 (1st
Cir. 1996), the First Circuit commented on its reading of the MESSAGE of United States v.
Virginia:
We point out that Virginia adds nothing to the analysis of equal protection
challenges to gender-based classifications that has not been part of that analysis since
1979 . . . . While the Virginia Court made liberal use of the phrase “exceedingly
persuasive justification,” and sparse use of the formulation “substantially related to
an important governmental objective,” the Court nevertheless struck down the
gender-based admissions policy at issue in that case under intermediate scrutiny, the
standard applied to gender-based classifications since 1976, when it was first
announced in Craig v. Boren . . . . The phrase “exceedingly persuasive justification”
has been employed routinely by the Supreme Court in applying intermediate
scrutiny to gender discrimination claims and is, in effect, a short-hand expression of
the well-established test.
Id. at 183 n.22 (citations omitted). In Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1998),
the Second Circuit evinced its belief that the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia is that
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This Note has already considered the Supreme Court’s gender-
based equal protection jurisprudence before United States v.
Virginia,173 the CONTEXT of Justice Ginsburg’s authorship of the
majority opinion,174 and the majority opinion’s CODE,175 all of which
suggest that the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia is that
intermediate scrutiny should be applied to gender classifications. The
manner in which the Court examined VMI’s admissions policy also
lends support to that interpretation of United States v. Virginia’s
MESSAGE. Although the Court acknowledged the importance of
Virginia’s interest in educational “diversity through single-sex
educational options,”176 the Court held that VMI’s admissions policy
was not, in fact, “‘in furtherance of a state policy of [educational]
“diversity.”’”177 This rejection of Virginia’s first argument was clearly
part of an intermediate scrutiny analysis, even though the Court
phrased the rejection in terms of the “furtherance of a state policy”178
and not in terms of the “substantial relation to a governmental
interest.”
gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny by quoting the Court’s description of
the current state of its gender-based equal protection jurisprudence and then applying
intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 141-42. In Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996), the
Eighth Circuit stated that “[a] facially gender-based classification is subject to heightened
scrutiny and violates the Equal Protection Clause if the classification is not substantially related
to the achievement of important governmental objectives.” Id. at 650 (citing United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982); Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). In Coalition for Economic
Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997), widely
known as the California Proposition 209 case, the Ninth Circuit cited United States v. Virginia
and held that, in order successfully to defend a gender classification, the government “must
demonstrate that the classification is substantially related to an important governmental
interest, requiring an ‘exceedingly persuasive’ justification.” Id. at 1440 (quoting City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)). Clarifying the law for a confused
district judge, see supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text, the Eleventh Circuit came to the
same conclusion in Engineering Contractors Ass’n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895
(11th Cir. 1997). The court stated that “although the phrase ‘exceedingly persuasive
justification’ has more linguistic verve than conventional descriptions of intermediate scrutiny,
it does not necessarily follow that a new constitutional standard for judging gender preferences
is embodied in that phrase,” id. at 907-08, and concluded that “intermediate scrutiny remains
the applicable constitutional standard in gender discrimination cases, and a gender preference
may be upheld so long as it is substantially related to an important governmental objective,” id.
at 908.
173. See supra Part I.
174. See supra Part II.A.
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996).
177. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
    178. Id.
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The Court’s rejection of Virginia’s second argument in support
of VMI’s admissions policy is also consistent with the application of
intermediate scrutiny. Virginia argued that VMI provided excellent
leadership training for students through the school’s unique
adversative method and that the participation of women would mean
the end of the adversative method.179 The Court rejected Virginia’s
argument and found that the adversative method could survive the
participation of women,180 with increased privacy for cadets being the
only significant change in the VMI experience.181 Here, as in earlier
gender-based discrimination cases,182 the Court simply did not believe
that the state’s purported objective was the actual reason for the
classification.183
A single footnote contains the only suggestion that the United
States v. Virginia Court might even have considered applying
something more than intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications.
In footnote six, the Court stated that it “has thus far reserved most
stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race.”184 This
statement can be interpreted either as a simple recitation of fact—
that the Court has only applied strict scrutiny to racial (and religious)
classifications—or as an indication that this history might not have
been operating as a limit on the Court in United States v. Virginia.
Regardless of how one interprets the footnote, though, it is difficult
to argue that the United States v. Virginia Court was prepared to
heighten the scrutiny applied to gender classifications.
179. See id. at 540. For an explanation of VMI’s adversative method of leadership training,
see supra note 105.
180. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542-46.
181. See id. at 550-51 n.19 (noting that women would require increased privacy and,
perhaps, different physical training standards, but that these changes had been effectively dealt
with at the service academies).
182. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (rejecting
Mississippi’s purported compensatory purpose of combating discrimination against women for
Mississippi University for Women’s admissions policy and finding that, in fact, the admissions
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause by “perpetuat[ing] the stereotyped view of nursing
as an exclusively woman’s job”); see also Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)
(recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause sometimes requires an inquiry into the
possibility that the legislature was motivated by an invidious intent to discriminate against
women); supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing use of the CODE “exceedingly
persuasive justification” in Feeney).
183. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536.
184. Id. at 532 n.6.
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Had Justice Ginsburg wanted to apply strict scrutiny in United
States v. Virginia,185 she probably could not have marshaled a majority
to do so. Absent sharp departures from their current stances, there
are not five Justices on the current Court who would subject gender
classifications to strict scrutiny.
Chief Justice Rehnquist would certainly object to any
heightening of scrutiny. He wrote a separate concurrence in United
States v. Virginia in order to express both his conviction that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of scrutiny for gender
classifications186 and his concern that the majority would be
misinterpreted as applying a stricter standard:
That phrase [“exceedingly persuasive justification”] is best confined,
as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the
applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself. To avoid
introducing potential confusion, I would have adhered more closely
to our traditional, “firmly established,” standard that a gender-based
classification “must bear a close and substantial relationship to
important governmental objectives.”187
This language serves no other function than to avoid any implication
that the United States v. Virginia Court was predisposed to
heightening the level of scrutiny applied to gender classifications.
Justice Scalia would also be unlikely to vote for the application
of strict scrutiny, given the subject of his dissent in United States v.
Virginia.188 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that “[i]t is well settled”
that gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, but
that he believes that intermediate scrutiny ought to be much less
185. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Court’s use of the CODE “skeptical scrutiny” in
United States v. Virginia). While the confusion over the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia
would have existed whether Justice Ginsburg intended it or not, one must remember that it is
pure conjecture that Justice Ginsburg would want to change the current state of the law. Her
ACLU work in the 1970s revealed a patient, long-term strategy for effecting change, but it
seems far-fetched that she would suppress her radical leanings for the twelve years that she sat
on the D.C. Circuit, hoping that she would someday be appointed to the Supreme Court where
she could once again indulge her desire to see gender classifications subjected to strict scrutiny.
Nonetheless, the Court should have realized the confusion that would be created by the
CONTEXT of her authoring the opinion, the emphasis on the CODE “exceedingly persuasive
justification,” and the introduction of the CODE “skeptical scrutiny.”
186. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
187. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting respectively
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273).
188. See id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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strict than the current state of the law would indicate.189 According to
Justice Scalia, placing the burden of proof on Virginia was a
misapplication of intermediate scrutiny190 despite the clear
requirement since Kirchberg that the state bear the burden of
proving a gender classification’s constitutionality.191 Clearly, if Justice
Scalia did not agree that states should bear this burden, then he
certainly would not agree that states should face the even heavier
burden that strict scrutiny would entail.
Given Justice Thomas’s dissenting vote in J.E.B.192 and his well-
recognized tendency to vote with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia,193 Justice Thomas would probably not have voted to subject
gender classifications to strict scrutiny. The final two votes against
subjecting gender classifications to strict scrutiny would likely have
come from Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, as their recent votes in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.194 indicate.
The Croson Court struck down a municipal affirmative action
plan that awarded a percentage of construction contracts to
businesses based on the race of the owners.195 In a concurring opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, Justice
O’Connor declared that strict scrutiny required that racial
classifications be “strictly reserved for remedial settings, [or] they
[the racial classifications] may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”196 From this
statement, one may deduce that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
believe that strict scrutiny permits discriminatory classifications to be
used only as remedial measures and not as preventative measures.
This understanding is very important given the United States v.
Virginia Court’s discussion of the preventative possibilities of VWIL,
the women-only analog to VMI.
189. Id. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Justice Scalia argued that the correct application of intermediate scrutiny required
consideration of Virginia’s “important state interest in providing effective college education for
its citizens,” an interest that the Court had ignored because Virginia had failed to argue that it
was an interest served by VMI’s admissions policy. Id. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
192. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 98 (discussing the dissent Justice Thomas joined in J.E.B.).
193. See Richard Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 1, 14 (1996).
194. 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989).
195. See id. at 507-08.
196. Id. at 493.
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As did the concurring opinion in Croson, the majority opinion in
United States v. Virginia first examines the remedial nature of the
state’s proposal. The United States v. Virginia Court concluded,
however, that VWIL “could not ‘eliminate the discriminatory effects
of the past.’”197 Unlike Justice O’Connor’s Croson concurrence,
however, the majority opinion in United States v. Virginia goes on to
consider whether VWIL’s single-sex admissions policy might have
some value as a preventative measure, asking whether VWIL
“could . . . at least bar [gender] discrimination in the future.”198 If
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy view strict scrutiny to prohibit the
preventative use of racial classifications but these Justices were
willing to consider the preventative effects of VWIL’s gender
classifications, then logic compels the conclusion that they could not
have been applying strict scrutiny in United States v. Virginia. Thus,
by joining an opinion that considers the preventative effects of the
discriminatory classifications used by VWIL, Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy implicitly acknowledged that strict scrutiny was not applied
in United States v. Virginia. Assuming that Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy vote with the conservative bloc of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, the possibility of a majority of the
Court permitting strict scrutiny to be applied to gender classifications
virtually ceases to exist.
CONCLUSION
The MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia emerges clearly. While
the emphasis placed on the CODE “exceedingly persuasive
justification” and the use of the CODE “skeptical scrutiny” were new
to United States v. Virginia, the manner in which those CODES were
used suggests that the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to VMI’s
admissions policy. The CONTEXT of Justice Ginsburg’s advocacy of
women’s rights is at best inconclusive. Moreover, even if she had
wanted the Court to apply strict scrutiny to gender classifications, she
probably could not have convinced four other Justices to join her.
Thus, the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia is the same as the
MESSAGES of the Court’s earlier gender-based equal protection cases:
gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
197. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 548 (1996) (quoting Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The CODE and CONTEXT of the majority opinion, however, have
confused many of the scholars and some of the judges who have tried
to ascertain the Court’s MESSAGE. Given this reaction, the Supreme
Court should be aware of how confusing a change in CODE can be
and should avoid making such changes lest confusion result. Because
even the most familiar tests and standards set out by the Supreme
Court “are hardly models of precision”199 and depend on maintaining
as much consistency of CODE as possible to convey the same
MESSAGE, great care must be taken by the Court to ensure that such
confusion does not lead the lower courts to make a move that the
Court itself was unwilling to make.
199. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
